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April 9, 2002 
As part of the ongoing global war against terrorism, the military campaign in Afghanistan continues, albeit 
with diminishing results. In the recently concluded Operation Anaconda, the allied forces suffered eight 
casualties, against many (unconfirmed) losses inflicted upon Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants. [1] There is 
growing unease among the European allies about continuing the military campaign. [2] It is time to 
analyze the war aims in Afghanistan, and the means adopted for meeting the challenge posed by 
terrorism in the wake of September 11, 2001.  
At the start of the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, the operational aims were: one, removal of the 
Taliban regime; two, neutralization of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; and three, capture of Osama Bin Laden 
and dismantling of his terrorist network. [3] Ever since the campaign started on October 7, 2001, the U.S.-
led allied forces have achieved spectacular successes. Relentless air and ground operations led to the 
defeat of Taliban forces without fighting major battles. The Taliban regime in Kabul has since been 
replaced by an interim Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. Although many Al-Qaeda operatives are 
thought to have escaped death or capture by the allied forces, as an organization Al-Qaeda is reported to 
have been crippled. The bulk of Al-Qaeda members have reportedly taken shelter in the southern and 
eastern mountainous regions of Afghanistan, and some are known to have escaped into neighboring 
Pakistan. [4] Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar remain elusive. It is not 
even known whether Bin Laden is dead or alive, although some recent reports suggest that he has so far 
survived the search by allied forces. [5] As President Bush has said, even if Bin Laden is alive, he has 
been marginalized. Also, contrary to concerns expressed in some circles early in the campaign that 
Afghanistan might become another Vietnam for the United States or might provoke a broad counter-
reaction in the Muslim world, the military campaign to date has progressed rather smoothly. Afghanistan's 
public has been largely supportive of allied military operations, and with few exceptions the reactions in 
other Muslim countries have manifested in no more than street protests. There was no mass uprising 
among Muslims, as had been contemplated.  
The two main achievements of the anti-terrorist military campaign in Afghanistan are: one, terrorists have 
been denied safe haven and freedom of action in Afghanistan; and two, it has been demonstrated to 
terrorists worldwide that the form of violence manifested in September 11, 2001 will not be tolerated by 
the United States and its allies.  
At this stage, the military operations are apparently aimed at weeding out remnants of Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban resistance. The overall environment and the ground situation that prevailed in October 2000 have 
changed markedly. The Taliban as an organized military opposition no longer exists; yet their remnants, 
and almost the entire Taliaban leadership, continue to be at large, and they are potentially harmful to the 
current Afghanistan regime. In some allied countries, domestic opposition to continuing the anti-terrorist 
military campaign in Afghanistan is increasing. [6] South Asian regional security dynamics have led to the 
withdrawal of Pakistani military forces that were earlier involved in anti-Taliban and anti-Al Qaeda 
operations. The campaign is gradually taking on the appearance of a unilateral American fight against Al-
Qaeda. The question therefore arises, are the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan absolutely 
necessary, and if so, how can the best results be achieved at a minimum cost? 
During the mid-1990s, the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan as a reaction to the anarchy and factionalism 
that prevailed in Afghanistan after the departure of Soviet forces. [7] An ultra radical and fanatical Taliban 
regime helped restore some semblance of order and stability in Afghanistan. The regime had a measure 
of acceptability and support among the Afghanistan populace that had helped the Taliban gain control of 
nearly 95 percent of Afghan territory. The regime's repressiveness, particularly against women, their 
abysmal human rights record, cultural excesses (destruction of Afghanistan's historical assets), coercive 
imposition of radical Islam, and finally their provision of safe haven for terrorists, global arms dealers, and 
drug peddlers, made the Taliban an international pariah. Their replacement by the current moderate 
Afghanistan government has brought a much sought respite to the Afghan population. This change 
resulted with active support of erstwhile anti-Taliban forces (the Northern Alliance), which represented 
minority ethnic communities. The Northern Alliance also continues to play a dominant role in the current 
Afghanistan government, which has caused skepticism among the majority ethnic community (Pushtuns) 
in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Some regional warlords in these areas are reportedly sheltering 
Taliban, and the Taliban ideology also continues to have some acceptability among such sections of 
Afghan society. [8] This factor of regional and societal support to Taliban could manifest in resistance to 
allied military operations in Afghanistan.  
Al-Qaeda is reportedly based in more than 60 countries around the world. [9] Prior to October 2001, 
Afghanistan formed the nerve center of their activities and also served as the main base for their 
ideological and terrorist training. Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan today is a fragmented lot. However, their 
leadership and core infrastructure have the potential to regroup and reactivate. Recent reports suggest 
that they are hibernating in small groups. It is very unlikely that they will ever enjoy the same degree of 
freedom that they did under the Taliban regime. Also, they are unlikely to provide targets warranting 
large-scale military action. In the earlier stages of anti-Taliban and anti-Al-Qaeda operations, massive use 
of air and ground assets was necessary and successful. However, in today's circumstances, the fighting 
is confined to isolated cave complexes, deep mountainous ravines, and urban areas. There are no well-
defined battle lines and no easily identifiable targets. Technology and numbers, which provided a decisive 
edge to the allied forces during the early phases of military operations, are now less relevant. In fact, in 
the current situation, the remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces are likely to be fighting on their familiar 
turf: motivated for revenge, employing guerilla tactics, drawing on local support where they can find it, and 
operating in familiar physical terrain. These forces have long years of battle experience under similar 
conditions. Retaliatory allied operations by use of aerial assets and heavy concentration of troops will 
likely result in losses to allied forces and heavy collateral damage, which will be exploited by the enemy 
for propaganda. Such operations may also imperil peacekeeping forces, as these forces are likely to be 
targeted by the enemy to instigate retaliation and gain propaganda material. Also, losses of civilian life 
and property will draw adverse publicity from human rights organizations, domestic institutions inside the 
allied countries, and especially the Muslim population around the world. Terrorism thrives by exploitation 
of fragile human emotions. Unnecessary loss of human lives resulting from large-scale military strikes will 
form cannon fodder for terrorists' propaganda, which could facilitate recruitment of more Jihadis around 
the world. 
Therefore, the ongoing anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan needs review both in strategy and approach. 
There is little likelihood of a quick exit by allies from the Afghanistan situation. Analysis of media reports 
and views expressed by military professionals suggest that a better approach to the current Afghanistan 
situation would be: one, enabling the Afghan population to develop resistance against exploitation by 
outside and domestic influences such as the Taliban; and two, preventing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from 
influencing the ongoing political transition in Afghanistan. By implication this means providing political, 
economic, and military support to the current Afghanistan government. It does not necessarily mean 
nation building, or any form of long-term security or economic commitment in the region.  
Military Strategy 
The Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which are currently in a state of disarray, will likely try to regroup and work 
toward undermining the present Afghanistan government. [10] They will try to gain the support of 
dissenting Afghan warlords, who were earlier sympathetic to the Taliban cause. Their tactics will include 
selective coercion to silence the local opposition, hit and run strikes, bombings by use of improvised 
explosives including suicide missions, and even suicide raids on the allied forces.  
Military strategy to meet potential threats in Afghanistan is a matter of professional judgment by the 
concerned military commanders. However, based on the experience of other militaries under similar 
circumstances in the sub-continent, the following methodology is suggested: one, swift, surgical 
operations based upon hard intelligence and supported by sufficient logistical support; two, area 
domination by mobile patrols (ground as well as aerial); three, covert and overt surveillance of suspected 
areas of terrorist operations; and four, location and maintenance of troops at a high state of readiness for 
engaging fleeting targets. Organizing an all-Afghan military and police force for peacekeeping and law 
enforcement is also necessary. The U.S. government has already offered to help train the Afghan Army. 
[11] 
As a major ally in this ongoing war against terrorism, Pakistan has significant stakes in Afghanistan's 
stability. However, Pakistan's antipathy toward the Northern Alliance elements in the Afghan transition 
government has significant bearing on Pakistani motives and intents in participating in the allied military 
campaign. Certain sections of Pakistan's polity continue to oppose the allied military campaign in 
Afghanistan. Allied commanders, while finalizing operational plans, should give adequate allowance to 
such negative factors and remain prepared for surprises. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources. 
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